**United Nations**
**Department of Peace Operations**
**Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs**
**Department of Operational Support**
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# Guidelines

# Improvised Explosive Device Threat Mitigation in Mission Settings

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# DPO, DPPA and DOS Guidelines on Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threat Mitigation in Mission Settings

**Contents:**


**A. Purpose and Rationale**
**B. Scope**
**C. Procedures**
**D. Roles and Responsibilities**
**E. Terms and Definitions**
**F. References**
**G. Monitoring and Compliance**
**H. Contact**
**I. History**


## ANNEXURES


A. Suggested participants and workflow for an IED Threat Mitigation Working Group
B. Examples of IED Threat Mitigation Capabilities.
C. Example of IED/UXO Incident Reporting Template.
D. Example of IED Awareness Material.


## A. PURPOSE AND RATIONALE

1. The purpose of these revised Guidelines on Improvised Explosive Device Threat Mitigation (IED-TM) in Mission Settings (hereafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') is to provide United Nations personnel with a generic set of planning and coordination considerations for IED threat mitigation within the context of United Nations field missions.

2. Individuals and groups in some conflict settings have increasingly used IEDs to injure and kill civilians and United Nations personnel alike and this has had a severe indirect and direct impact on United Nations field missions, political processes and humanitarian interventions. When operating in an IED threat environment, it is imperative that the United Nations takes concrete steps to enhance the safety and security of mission personnel and assets, including force protection, and to ensure mobility in support of effective and safe delivery of mission mandates.

3. On 9 December 2015, the General Assembly adopted the resolution on Assistance in Mine Action (A/RES/70/80), which recognized the humanitarian threat posed by IEDs in post-conflict situations. On 5 December 2016, the General Assembly adopted the resolution "Countering the Threat Posed by IEDs" (A/RES/71/72), expressing grave concern at the serious harm IED attacks have caused to United Nations personnel, limiting their freedom of movement and ability to effectively deliver mandates.[1]The Security Council, in resolution 2365, adopted on 30 June 2017 noted with grave concern that IEDs remain a major threat to the civilian population, the safety of peacekeeping personnel, and the effective implementation of mission mandates.[2]Furthermore, in his Agenda for Disarmament, Securing our Common Future, the

[1] Previous resolutions relating to the threat posed by IEDs include A/70/46, A/71/46, A/72,36 and A/73/67 preambular paragraph 4
[2] S/RES/2365 (2017) preambular paragraph 8

Secretary-General committed that "United Nations entities, under the leadership of the United Nations Mine Action Service, in cooperation with the Office for Disarmament Affairs and other relevant United Nations entities, will promote a strengthened and coherent United Nations inter-agency coordination on improvised explosive devices to ensure a whole-of-system approach."[3]

4. These Guidelines respond to the increasing threat posed by IEDs to United Nations personnel and assets, to the need identified at mission level to develop an effective IED threat mitigation response, and to concerns expressed by the legislative bodies. The Guidelines focus on United Nations threat mitigation activities that support mandate delivery by improving mission mobility, the safety and security of personnel and the protection of civilians. These Guidelines are not intended to outline operational tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), or to provide guidance on the development of a comprehensive Counter-IED response.

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## B. SCOPE

5. These Guidelines are applicable to all civilian and uniformed personnel deployed to United Nations field missions where IEDs pose, or could pose, a threat and are a resource for personnel involved in mission planning and coordination at the strategic and operational levels throughout the mission life-cycle.

6. These Guidelines are also applicable where United Nations presence is mandated to provide mission support for regional operations.

7. These Guidelines provide a basis for the future development of manuals, handbooks, associated guidance and training materials related to IED threat mitigation. These Guidelines may also serve as a reference tool for personnel deployed in non-mission settings.

8. The application of these Guidelines will vary within the mission environment based on mandate, size, composition and resources as well as the threat mitigation response required. Where resources permit, Missions may develop internal IED threat mitigation Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) consistent with these Guidelines and existing policy guidance of the United Nations Security Management System.

## C. PROCEDURES

### General Principles

9. These Guidelines comply with and complement existing policies of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) Security Policy Manual.[4]

10. Threat mitigation responsibilities should follow a whole-of-system approach during all phases of United Nations field missions.

11. These Guidelines suggest how a mission might embed IED threat mitigation responses within typical assessment and decision-making frameworks to ensure an efficient, holistic approach.

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[3] United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs, "Securing our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament", May 2018

[4] Chapter IV, Section Y on Improvised Explosive Devices and Chapter IV, Section E on Security of United Nations Premises of the UNSMS Policy applies only to United Nations civilian staff. It should be noted that the UNSMS remains applicable in cases where civilian staff and uniformed personnel are co-located in mission premises.

**IED Threat Mitigation in Mission Life-Cycle**

12. These Guidelines elaborate measures available to the United Nations to conduct IED threat mitigation in all phases of the mission life-cycle, which includes:
    - Assessments and mission planning, including mission concept and mission plan development
    - Mission start-up
    - Mandate implementation
    - Transition or drawdown

13. Key entry points where consideration of IED threat mitigation is vital include the following:
    - Assessments and planning (including contingency planning)
    - Force generation: Identification and deployment of IED response capacities
    - Training (pre-deployment and in-mission)
    - Acquisition of equipment
    - Deployment of support resources (e.g. CASEVAC planning and response)
    - Infrastructure design, development, and vulnerability assessments
    - Reporting and responding to an IED incident or threat
    - Coordination (internal and external)

14. The roles and responsibilities of various United Nations stakeholders associated with these key entry points are outlined in Section D, Table 1.

<u>Assessments, planning and strategy development</u>

15. During the conduct of a Strategic Assessment or Review[5] the possible threat of IEDs, or other explosive threats should be considered and properly accounted for. Accordingly, assessment and planning processes should integrate expertise on explosive and IED threat mitigation, when and where warranted.

16. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is the service provider to secretariat entities for mine action and maintains the technical expertise required to assess the threat and potential impact of IEDs and ot (her explosive hazards. Missions should call on UNMAS expertise to participate, support, or advise during assessment and planning processes, which may include the conduct of an assessment mission and/or technical survey.[6]

17. If an IED threat exists, it should be reviewed through the Security Risk Management process with a view to identifying appropriate security risk management measures as required by the UN Security Management System.[7]

18. Consideration should be given throughout all mission planning processes to identify specific resources (materiel, personnel, etc.) required for effective IED threat mitigation measures. Findings related to threats posed by IEDs noted in relevant assessments should inform the development of the mission concept and the mission plan and, where applicable, the budget, as well as the military, police, support and security concepts and plans. Under the Delegation of

[5] See United Nations Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) and DPKO/DFS Policy on Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Operations (2017).
[6] As defined in the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), 08.20.
[7] See UNSMS Policy on Security Risk Management SRM for the steps in the process to identify context specific security risk management measures. This Policy identifies the measures to mitigate and prevent threats are the "security risk management measures" resulting from the SRM process carried out by UN security professionals for the protection of UN personnel under the UNSMS.

Authority, material and equipment needs should be addressed to the Head of Mission in relation to budget preparation. IED threat mitigation requirements should also be noted in the Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR)[8]/Force Requirement (FR) documents. Annex B includes examples of IED threat mitigation capabilities that could be considered as part of mission planning and concept of operation development.

Force generation: Identification and deployment of uniformed capabilities

19. Information on existing IED threats can aid Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) in their ability and responsibility to prepare threat mitigation measures. OMA and PD should inform (T/PCCs), military/ police observers, Formed Police Units and Guard Units of IED threats when invited to take part in the selection process for deployment. A mission's operational documents may be shared for T/PCC's early preparation (training and equipment) and should duly be reflected in the unit's Statements of Unit Requirements (SUR). The SUR is prepared in consultation with the field mission in question, and it is essential that the mission assesses the SUR against operational environment and field requirements.

20. Further details to inform training may be provided when the T/PCCs travel to the mission area during reconnaissance visits, in line with the DPO Policy on Contributing Country Reconnaissance Visits (ref. 2005.6). When applicable, required IED-TM capabilities will be included in a MOU with the force providing T/PCC.

21. The process of assessing IED threat mitigation preparedness should be continuous. DPO should ascertain TCC and PCC preparedness during assessment and advisory visits, and the pre-deployment visits in advance of each contingent's induction, in line with the Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement Policy.

22. OMA will identify uniformed capabilities in accordance with the United Nations military standards as outlined in the Military Unit Manual series. OMA should include language on what areas of IED threat mitigation are required by a particular unit in SURs.

Training

23. All United Nations civilian and individual military and police personnel deployed in missions facing an IED threat should undertake training in basic IED information and awareness, preferably as part of the induction process. IED awareness training is available for United Nations personnel through the Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE) training managed by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS).[9] In addition, the UNMAS handbook "Landmine, Explosive Remnants of War and IED Safety Handbook" is available online in Arabic, English and French.[10] Examples of IED awareness material that could be disseminated by missions are included in Annex C. Relevant information should also be included in the tailored security briefing that United Nations Department of Safety

8 The Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR) details the organization, concept of employment, capabilities, tasks, major equipment and level of self-sustainment required for formed military in the Peacekeeping Operations or Special Political Mission. The SUR also facilitates and guides the military force generation process and enable the TCCs to prepare their units prior to deploying to a Field Mission.

9 SSAFE training is not necessarily provided by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) in all cases, but it does manage the training globally. Irrespective of which entity provides the SSAFE course, it must be coordinated and run through the SMT & SRM process.

10 Handbook is available in Arabic - https://unmas.org/sites/default/files/handbook_arabic_0.pdf ; English - https://unmas.org/sites/default/files/handbook_english.pdf ; French - https://unmas.org/sites/default/files/handbook_french_0.pdf ;

and Security (UNDSS) routinely provides to all newly arriving United Nations personnel to field missions as part of the onboarding process.

24. In accordance with the Policy on Training for All United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel, and under General Assembly resolution A/49/37, Member States bear the responsibility for the pre-deployment training of all military and police contingents provided to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Member States should include applicable United Nations approved IED awareness modules as part of troop contingent and formed police pre-deployment training. Given that the use of IEDs continues to expand globally, maintaining IED awareness is important whether the threat is present or not within a specific mission at the time of deployment. The approved UN training modules include Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD) and IED Disposal (IEDD) designed for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) forces, Explosive Hazard Awareness Training (EHAT) for every uniformed peacekeeper, and IED threat mitigation for staff officers serving within unit headquarters.

25. The Integrated Mission Training Centre (IMTC) should serve as a resource and coordinating office on additional mission-specific training for contingents as requirements arise, depending on the operating environment. Where T/PCCs are deployed in mission settings with an IED threat, they should ensure coordination with the IMTCs for necessary additional training requirements.

Acquisition of equipment

26. Throughout the mission life cycle, planning for, budgeting, and the acquisition of equipment and services required for mitigating the IED threat applicable to each specific mission should be based on a thorough assessment of the explosive threat and undertaken in a realistic and timely manner and procured through the established mission procurement channels.[11]

Infrastructure design and construction

27. The mission support chief or director should ensure that mission facilities and installations occupied by civilian or individual police/ military personnel are designed and constructed in accordance with the country-specific security risk management process.

28. T/PCCs, in conjunction with mission support components, are responsible for the construction and security of their bases and should include IED threat mitigation measures, with the exception of UNGU whose housing and deployment shall be undertaken in line with United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) SOP 1/2015. Of note, if civilian personnel, or other personnel covered by United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS), are co-located within contingent bases, the UNSMS Security Risk Management policy guidance is applicable in identifying context-specific security risk management measures.

Reporting and responding to an IED incident or threat

29. The mission should ensure the use of a standardized process for recording, collecting, analysing and disseminating IED incident data. The process of reporting an IED can be found in the IED Threat Mitigation Military and Police Handbook (2017).[12].If an IED threat emerges in a field mission, mission leadership should inform UN HQ through official communication.

[11] equipment acquired as “security risk management measures” identified in the SRM process should follow the normal procurement process for SRM measures.
[12] The IED incident report format is drawn from the IED Threat Mitigation Military and Police Handbook, Annex B ‘IED / EO Reporting Form’ (Page 100).

30. Information management systems at the field level depend on mission mandate and resourcing, for example, the SAGE Database is used in peacekeeping missions. Regardless of the specific database used, it is important that IED reports are catalogued and disseminated to relevant stakeholders.

31. Data collection processes should be tailored according to mission requirements for potential use by, where relevant, the IED Threat Mitigation Working Group, the Joint Operations Centres (JOCs), UNSMS Security Information and Operations Centres (SIOC), and Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) along with Force Headquarters staff.

32. The SMART IED Threat Mitigation Roadmap (SMiTMiTR) is an information sharing platform designed to link current and emerging threats within mission and non-mission environments to technical experts and industry solutions to assist in mitigating the IED threat.

Coordination: Establishing an IED Threat Mitigation Working Group

33. The Head of Mission (HoM), in coordination with the Designated Official, should convene an IED Threat Mitigation working group (WG) to initiate a threat assessment drawing on DPO IED-expertise and, if necessary, develop an IED threat mitigation strategy. The composition of the WG and the IED threat mitigation governance structure may vary depending on the size, available resources and level of threat within the mission; however, the WG should consist of relevant mission focal points (see annex A for example) to understand the risks and plan preliminary mitigation measures and should follow the requirements of the Risk Management Process to understand the risks, plan preliminary mitigation measures. The HoM may chair or designate a senior mission leader to chair.

34. As per Annex A, the WG will define and manage IED threat mitigation efforts within the mission. The WG may submit recommendations for decision to the Designated Official and the Senior Management Team.

Coordination with UN country team and external partners

35. Coordination with the United Nations country team (UNCT), through the Security Management Team (SMT), is critical for information-sharing, identification of synergies and resource sharing (should specialised assets also be used by the UNCT), particularly where the mission mandate includes enabling an operational environment, including necessary security conditions, for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the IED threat mitigation working group may coordinate with other key partners, such as the host government and/or other multilateral presences to identify areas of cooperation that can contribute to mitigating the IED threat. Mission leadership may request UNMAS to liaise and coordinate with UN country team partners, as UNMAS typically works closely with the country team and other humanitarian partners.[13] Where UNMAS is not present, the UNCT may be approached to designate a coordination focal point for the IED TF working group.

Information management

36. WG members will assess information and threat mitigation activities that should be undertaken. If the HoM approves, the recommendations should be disseminated and implemented by the relevant mission component. The WG should continue to monitor and collect feedback on the activities undertaken.

[13] Specifically via the Mine Action Area of Responsibility, within the Protection Cluster structure, where activated.

37. The WG should decide the frequency with which this information flow cycle should take place (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) based on the level of threat and frequency of incidents. The WG might establish criteria for scheduling *ad hoc* meetings or meet as the need arises.

38. Figure 1, below, provides a generic information loop, for reference in the collection of IED-related information in support of WG processes.




Figure 1: IED-related information flow

## D. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

39. The table below provides a consolidated but not exhaustive list of United Nations stakeholders both at the headquarters and mission level who can be called upon when planning and coordinating efforts related to IED threat mitigation.

| Planning and Coordination Considerations | United Nations Stakeholders |
|---|---|
| **Assessments and Planning** | - Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) or the relevant backstopping teams in the respective Divisions of DPO/DPPA shared structure.<br>- Division of Healthcare Management and Occupational Safety and Health (DHMOSH)<br>- DPPA Security Focal Point<br>- DPO Security Focal Point<br>- Department of Operational Support (DOS)<br>- United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)<br>- Office of Military Affairs (OMA)<br>- Integrated Task Force (ITF) |

| | |
|---|---|
| | - Inter-agency Task Force (IATF)<br>- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)<br>- Police Division (PD)<br>- Mission planning units or staff serving planning functions<br>- Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC)<br>- Joint Operations Centre (JOC)<br>- Mission Force (esp. EOD and U2 components)<br>- UNPOL<br>- CSA |
| **Equipment** | - OMA<br>- PD<br>- Department of Operational Support (DOS); Uniformed Capabilities Support Division (UCSD)<br>- UNMAS |
| **Training** | - Integrated Training Service (ITS)<br>- Integrated Mission Training Centres (at mission level)<br>- UNMAS<br>- Special Political Mission (SPM) Training Unit or Training Focal Point<br>- DPPA Policy and Mediation Division<br>- United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)<br>- OMA<br>- PD |
| **Infrastructure design, development, and vulnerability assessment** | - UNMAS<br>- DOS (Engineering)<br>- United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) |
| **Coordination** | - Designated Official and Security Management Teams<br>- United Nations country team<br>- IED Threat Mitigation Working Group (mission level)<br>- Mission CoS |
| **Information management: reporting, data management and analysis** | - United Nations Operations Crisis Centre (UNOCC)<br>- Joint Operations Centre (JOC)<br>- United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) Threat & Risk Assessment Unit<br>- Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) or related analysis cells<br>- Force HQ<br>- UN Police HQ<br>- IED Threat Mitigation Working Group (mission level)<br>- SIOC (Security Information Operations Centre)<br>- UNMAS |

Table1: Headquarters and Mission-Level Stakeholders

## E. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

40. For the purpose of these Guidelines, the terms listed below have been defined as follows:

**Improvised explosive device (IED)**: An explosive device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic materials or chemicals and designed to destroy, disfigure or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military components.[14]

**IED threat mitigation:** The range of efforts to prevent, respond to and neutralize the IED system, by providing training and capacity development, defeating the device, and understanding the system.

1. **Training and capacity development:** The risk education and training of civilians in public safety; training the military and police in the methods of identifying, protecting against, and safely reacting to the IED threat; and development of national capacities of specialized enablers such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal / IED Disposal (EOD/IEDD) teams, with training and mentorship provided by experienced and trained EOD/IEDD subject matter experts.

2. **Defeat the device:** A defensive line of operation undertaken as part of IED Threat Mitigation activities which include all actions and activities designed to decrease the likelihood and reduce the effects of IED detonations for safe operations, including:
    a. Search activities;
    b. Conventional Munition Disposal activities;
    c. IEDD activities (including neutralizing and hazard disposal, as appropriate);
    d. Support to mission partners

3. **Degrade the Network:** Includes capabilities of EOD/IEDD enablers to safely collect devices, components, and material for final disposal, verify components are free of explosive material, produce relevant reports for designated UN Mission entities and authorized stakeholders to support the Rule of Law efforts and mission mandates.

**Counter-IED (C-IED):** The collective efforts to defeat an improvised explosive device system by degrading threat networks, defeating improvised explosive devices and preparing a force to operate in an explosive threat environment.[15]

**Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD):** The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and disposal of explosive ordnance.[16]

**Improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD):** Locating, identifying, rendering safe and disposing of IEDs, using specialized IEDD procedures and equipment by qualified specialists.

41. Unless otherwise indicated, the above terms have been developed specifically for use in these guidelines.

[14] IMAS 4.10 Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations, Second Edition (Amendment 10, February 2019) pg 24
[15] Draft OMA Military EOD Unit Manual, pg. 149, Aug. 2020
[16] IMAS 4.10 Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations, Second Edition (Amendment 10, February 2019) pg 19

## F. REFERENCES

### Normative or superior references

A. Resolution on Countering the Threat Posed by IEDs (A/70/46) and subsequent resolutions.
B. Resolution on Assistance in Mine Action (A/70/80) and subsequent resolutions
C. Manual on Policies and Procedures concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (A/75/121)
D. Resolution on Mine Action (S/RES/2365)

### Related procedures or guidelines

E. IED Threat Mitigation Military and Police Handbook (Ref. 24556, 2017)
F. International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) (2015)
G. International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) IED Disposal (IEDD) (2019)
H. International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) IEDD Competency Standards (2019)
I. United Nations Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (2013, reviewed in 2018) – *under review*
J. DPKO/DFS Policy on Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Operations (2017)
K. DPKO/DFS Policy on Training for All United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel (2010.20)
L. DPO Policy on Pre-Deployment Visits (2005.3) –*under review*
M. DPO SOP on Pre-Deployment Visits (2005.4) –*under review*
N. DPO/DOS SOP on Planning and Implementing Assessment and Advisory Visits (2020.10)
O. DPO Policy on Contributing Country Reconnaissance Visits (2005.6) – *under review*
P. DPKO/DFS Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement Policy (2015.16)
Q. United Nations Military Unit Manuals (UNMUM) series related to: Engineer's Unit & CET Search and Detect (2020), Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (2020), Peacekeeping Intelligence (2019)
R. United Nations IED Disposal Standards (IEDD) (2018)
S. UNMAS Improvised Explosive Device Lexicon (2017)
T. Report of the Secretary-General on the Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/357-S/2015/682)
U. Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (2015)
V. Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping (2015)
W. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialized Training Material (2020)
X. United Nations Security Management System *Security Policy Manual*, Chapter IV, Section A, Security Risk Management
Y. United Nations Security Management System *Security Policy Manual*, Chapter III, "Applicability of United Nations Security Management System"
Z. United Nations Security Management System *Security Policy Manual*, Chapter IV, Section Y, "Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)"
AA. United Nations Security Management System *Security Policy Manual*, Chapter IV, Section E, Security of United Nations Premises
BB. United Nations Landmines, Explosive Remnants of War and Improvised Explosive Device Safety Handbook, UNMAS, 2015

## G. MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE

42. Within field missions including peacekeeping operations and special political missions, the Head of Mission, or designated individual with delegated authority, is responsible for the monitoring and implementation of these Guidelines.

## H. CONTACT

43. The contact for the Guidelines is UNMAS (directorunmas@un.org).

## I. HISTORY

44. This revision supersedes the previous version of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threat Mitigation Guidelines in Mission Settings (Ref. 201614) dated 1 May 2016.

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## Annex A: Suggested participants and workflow for an IED Threat Mitigation Working Group




***Indicative list of participants may include the following:**

- Force HQ Staff (U2/3/5/7/8)
- EOD Advisor
- Police
- Mission Support
- JMAC
- UNMAS
- POC Advisor
- UNDSS/Security Advisor
- Political Advisor

**Outside partners if deemed appropriate:**

- National Military/Police
- Affected NGOs/IOs
- Other National Military/Police forces allowed by the host government

**Annex B: Examples of IED Threat Mitigation Capabilities**

The table below provides examples of capabilities that can be requested by mission planners in support of IED threat mitigation measures. This list is not exhaustive and the capacity to fulfill each function may vary and should be tailored according to the needs of the mission.

| Capability | Function |
|---|---|
| Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) | Specialized teams trained in the detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery and disposal of explosive ordnance, including IEDs. |
| Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD) | Subset of EOD capability; Specialized teams trained in the detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery and disposal of explosive ordnance |
| Improvised Explosive Device Disposal | Subset of EOD capability; Specialized teams trained in the detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery and disposal of all forms of IEDs. |
| Search Teams | Specialized search teams used in the detection of IEDs, often used alongside EOD teams. |
| Explosive Detection Dogs (EDD) | Consists of the handler and dog specifically trained in the detection of explosives. |
| Route Clearance Patrols (RCP) | Specially equipped teams with the equipment designed to aid in identifying IEDs and explosives hazards along routes of travel within the mission area. |
| Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities | Specialized equipment and techniques for increasing the mission's situational awareness related to IED use. |
| Weapons Intelligence Teams (WIT) (also referred to as Weapons Exploitation Teams (WET) or Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) | Specialized teams that conduct post incident investigation and collect forensic data. |
| Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) | Equipment designed for use against the threat of Remote Controlled IEDs (RCIED). |

**Annex C: IED/UXO incident reporting template**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Improvised Explosive Device Incident Report (File Number) | 1. Formation and Search & EOD Team Number | 2. Control Number | 3. Unusual ☐<br>4. Routine ☐ |
| **SECTION A: INITIAL INFORMATION** | | | |
| 5. Date/Time Reported | 9. Incident Location | | 11.Item(s) Reported |
| 6. Reported By | | | |
| 7. Phone Number | 10.Whom to Contact (including telephone number) | | |
| 8. Address | | | |
| **SECTION B: ACTION BY EOD OPERATOR** | | | |
| 1. Personnel Dispatched | 2. Date/Time | 3. Travel Data | 4. Man Hours |
| | 13.1 Departure | 14.1Air-Flying Time | 15.1 Travel |
| | 13.2 Arrival | 14.2 Vehicle-Mileage | 15.2 Incident |
| | 13.3 Completion | | |
| 5. Confirmed Identification/Nomenclature | | 6. Disposition | |
| 7. Incident Narrative (Include all Significant Details and Problems) Separate page may be attached. | | | |
| 8. Authentication | | | |
| 19.1 IEDD Team Leader | 19.2 Telephone Number | 19.3 Date | |

## Annex D: Examples of IED Awareness Material

These are examples of IED awareness material that can be reproduced and distributed throughout the mission. These are also available in French and Arabic, upon request, from UNMAS.












STAY ALIVE!
WEAR YOUR HELMET
STRAP IN CORRECTLY
TIE DOWN LOOSE OBJECTS


STAY ALIVE!
1ST TIME
2ND TIME
3RD TIME
DON'T SET PATTERNS


STAY ALIVE!
1ST TIME
2ND TIME
3RD TIME
DON'T SET PATTERNS


STAY ALIVE!
ALWAYS CHECK VULNERABLE POINTS

STAY ALIVE!
ALWAYS
CHECK
VULNERABLE
POINTS

STAY ALIVE!
5-25
5-25
5-25
5-25
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SEARCH